Abstract. A simple type confusion attack occurs in a security protocol, when a principal interprets data of one type as data of another. These attacks can be successfully prevented by \tagging" types of each eld of a message. Complex type confusions occur instead when tags can be confused with data and when elds or sub-segments of elds may be confused with concatenations of elds of other types. Capturing these kinds of confusions is not easy in a process calculus setting, where it is generally assumed that messages are correctly interpreted. In this paper, we model in the process calculus LYSA only the misinterpretation due to the confusion of a concatenation of elds with a single eld, by extending the notation of one-to-one variable binding to many-to-one binding. We further present a formal way of detecting these possible misinterpretations, based on a Control Flow Analysis for this version of the calculus. The analysis over-approximates all the possible behaviour of a protocol, including those eected by these type confusions. As an example, we considered the amended Needham-Schroeder symmetric protocol, where we succeed in detecting the type confusion that lead to a complex type aw attacks it is subject to. Therefore, the analysis can capture potential type confusions of this kind on security protocols, besides other security properties such as condentiality, freshness and message authentication.
Introduction
In the last decades, formal analyses of cryptographic protocols have been widely studied and many formal methods have been put forward. Usually, protocol specication is given at a very high level of abstraction and several implementation aspects, such as the cryptographic ones, are abstracted away. Despite the abstract working hypotheses, many attacks have been found that are independent of these aspects. Sometimes, this abstract view is not completely adequate, though. At a high level, a message in a protocol consists of elds: each represents some value, such as the name of a principal, a nonce or a key. This structure can be easily modelled by a process calculus. Nevertheless, at a more concrete level, a message is nothing but a raw sequence of bits. In this view, the recipient of a message has to decide the interpretation of the bit string, i.e. how to decompose the string into substrings to be associated to the expected elds (of the expected length) of the message. The message comes with no indication on its arity and on the types of its components. This source of ambiguity can be exploited by an intruder that can fool the recipient into accepting as valid a message dierent from the expected one. A type confusion attack arises in this case.
A simple type confusion occurs when a eld is confused with another [16] . The current preventing techniques [13] consists in systematically associating message elds with tags representing their intended type. On message reception, honest participants check tags so that elds with dierent types cannot be mixed up. As stated by Meadows [17] , though, simple tags could not suce for more complex type confusion cases: \in which tags may be confused with data, and terms of pieces of terms of one type may be confused with concatenations of terms of several other types." Tags should also provide the length of tagged elds.
Here, we are interested in semantically capturing attacks that occur when a concatenation of elds is confused with a single eld [24] . Suppose, e.g. that the message pair (A; N ), where A is a principal identity and N is a fresh nonce, is interpreted as a key K, from the receiver of the message. For simplicity, we call them complex type confusion attacks. This level of granularity is dicult to capture with a standard process calculus. An alternative could be separating control from data, as in [1] , and using equational theories on data; this however makes mechanical analysis more expensive. In a standard process algebraic framework, there is no way to confuse a term (A; N ) with a term K. The term is assumed to abstractly model a message, plugging in the model the hypothesis that the message is correctly interpreted. In concrete implementation this confusion is instead possible, provided that the two strings have the same length.
As a concrete example, consider the Amended Needham Schroeder symmetric key protocol [9] . It aims at distributing a new session key K between two agents, Alice (A) and Bob (B), via a trusted server S. Initially each agent is assumed to share a long term key, K A and K B resp., with the server. The protocol narration is reported in Fig. 1 (a) . In messages 1 and 2, A initiates the protocol with B. The protocol is vulnerable to a complex type aw attack, discovered by Long [14] and shown in Fig. 1 (b) . It requires two instances of the protocol, running in parallel. In one, A plays the roles of initiator and in the other that of responder. In the rst instance, A initiates the protocol with B. In the meantime, the attacker, M , initiates the second instance with A and sends the triple N A ; B; K H to A (in step 1 H ). The nonce N A is a copy from step 3 in the rst instance and K H is a faked key generated by the attacker. A will generate and send out the encryption of the received elds, N A ; B; K H , and a nonce N H A . The attacker M (S) impersonates S and replays this message to A in the rst instance. A decrypts this message, checks the nonce N A and the identity B, and accepts K H as the session key, which is actually generated by the attacker. After the challenge and response steps (6 and 7), A will communicate with M using the faked key K H .
Our idea is to explore complex type confusion attacks, by getting closer to the implementation, without crossing the comfortable borders of process calculi. To this aim, we formally model the possible misinterpretations between terms and concatenations of terms. More precisely, we extend the notation of one-toone variable binding to many-to-one binding in the process calculus LYSA [5] , that we use to model security protocols. The Control Flow Analysis soundly over-approximates the behaviour of protocols, by collecting the set of messages that can be sent over the network, and by recording which values variables may be bound to. Moreover, at each binding occurrence of a variable, the analysis checks whether there is any many-to-one binding possible and records it as a binding violation. The approach is able to detect complex type confusions possibly leading to attacks in cryptographic protocols. Other security properties can be addressed in the same framework, by just changing the values of interest of the Control Flow Analysis, while its core does not change.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present the syntax and semantics of the LYSA calculus. In Section 3, we introduce the Control Flow Analysis and we describe the Dolev-Yao attacker used in our setting. Moreover, we conduct an experiment to analyse the amended Needham-Schoreder symmetric key protocol. Section 4 concludes the paper.
The LYSA Calculus
The LySa calculus [5] is a process calculus, designed especially for modelling cryptographic protocols in the tradition of the - [20] and Spi- [2] calculi. It diers from these essentially in two aspects: (1) the absence of channels: all processes have only access to a single global communication channel, the network; (2) the inclusion of pattern matching into the language constructs where values can become bound to values, i.e. into input and into decryption (while usually there is a separate construct).
Syntax In LYSA, the basic building blocks are values, V P V al, which correspond to closed terms, i.e. terms without free variables. Values are used to represent keys, nonces, encrypted messages, etc. Syntactically, they are described by expressions E P Expr (or terms) that may either be variables, names, or encryptions. Variables and names come from two disjoint sets V ar, ranged over by x, and N ame, ranged over by n, respectively. Finally, expressions may be encryptions of a k-tuple of other expressions, in which case, E 0 is the key used to perform the encryption. LYSA expressions are, in turn, used to construct LYSA processes P P P roc as shown below. Here, we assume perfect cryptography. E ::= n j x j fE 1 ; : : : ; E k g E0 P ::= hE 1 ; : : : ; E k i:P j (E 1 ; : : : ; E j ; x j+1 ; : : : ; x k ) l :P decrypt E as fE 1 ; : : : ; E j ; x j+1 ; : : : ; x k g l E0 in P j ( n)P j P 1 jP 2 j !P j 0
The set of free variables, resp. free names, of a term or a process is dened in the standard way. As usual we omit the trailing 0 of processes. The label l from a denumerable set Lab (l P Lab) in the input and in the decryption constructs uniquely identies each input and decryption point, resp., and is mechanically attached.
In addition to the classical constructs for composing processes, LYSA contains an input and a decryption construct with pattern matching. Patterns are in the form (E 1 ; ¡ ¡ ¡ ; E j ; x j+1 ; ¡ ¡ ¡ ; x k ) and are matched against k To model complex type confusions, we need to allow a pattern matching to succeed also in the cases in which the length of lists is dierent. The extension of the notation of pattern matching and variable binding will be referred as many-to-one binding. Patterns are then allowed to be matched against expressions with at least the same number of elements. A single variable can then be bound also to a concatenation of values. Since there may be more values than variables, we partition the values into groups (or lists) such that there are the same number of value groups and variables. Now, each group of values is bound to the corresponding variable. In this new setting, the pattern in The idea is that encryptions cannot be directly attened when belonging to a list of general values. Their contents are instead attened when received and analysed in the decryption phase.
To perform many-to-one bindings, we resort to a partition operator Example 2. Consider the successful matching of (m; x 1 ; x 2 ) against (m; n 1 ; n 2 ; n 3 ). Since Q 2 (n 1 ; n 2 ; n 3 ) = f((n 1 ); (n 2 ; n 3 )); ((n 1 ; n 2 ); (n 3 ))g, it results in two possible eects (recall that for each i, e T i must be non-empty), i.e.
{ binding variable x 1 to (n 1 ) and binding variable x 2 to (n 2 ; n 3 ), or { binding variable x 1 to (n 1 ; n 2 ) and binding variable x 2 to (n 3 ).
Finally, we dene the relation = F as the least equivalence over V al and (by overloading the symbol) and over F lat that includes: At run time, the complex type confusions are checked by a reference monitor, which aborts when there is a possibility that a concatenation of values is bound to a single variable. We consider two variants of the reduction relation As for the dynamic property of the process, we say that a process is complex type coherent, when there is no complex type confusions, i.e. there is no manyto-one binding in any of its executions. Consequently, the reference monitor will never stop any execution step.
Denition 1 (Complex Type Coherence). A process P is complex type coherent if for all the executions P 3 £ P H 3 P HH whenever P H 3 P HH is derived 
The Control Flow Analysis
Our analysis aims at safely over-approximating how a protocol behaves and when the reference monitor may abort the computation.
The Control Flow Analysis describes a protocol behaviour by collecting all the communications that a process may participate in. In particular, the analysis records which value tuples may ow over the network (see the analysis component below) and which value variables may be bound to (component ). This gives information on bindings due to pattern matching. Moreover, at each binding occurrence, the Control Flow Analysis checks whether there is any many-to-one binding possible, and records it as a binding violation (component ). Formally, the approximation, or estimate, is a triple (; ; ) (respectively, a pair (; ) when analysing an expression E) that satises the judgements dened by the axioms and rules in Tab. 2.
Analysis of Expressions For each expression E, our analysis will determine a superset of the possible values it may evaluate to. For this, the analysis keeps track of the potential values of variables, by recording them into the global abstract environment:
: 3 (V al) that maps the variables to the sets of general values that they may be bound to, i.e. if a P (x) then x may take the value a.
The judgement for expressions takes the form j = E : # where # V al £ is an acceptable estimate (i.e. a sound over-approximation) of the set of general value lists that E may evaluate to in the environment . The judgement is dened by the axioms and rules in the upper part of Tab. 2. Basically, the rules demand that # contains all the value lists associated with the components of a term, e.g. a name n evaluates to the set #, provided that n belongs to #; similarly for a variable x, provided that # includes the set of value lists (x) to which x is associated with. 
(; ) j = P : (; ) j =!P : (Nil) (; ) j = 0 : Table 2 . Analysis of terms; j = E : #, and processes: (; ) j = P : More precisely, it (i) checks the validity of estimates i for each expression E i ; (ii) requires that all the values obtained by attening the k-tuples V 1 ; :::; V k , such that V i P i , can ow on the network, i.e. that they are in the component ; (iii) requires that the estimate (; ; ) is valid also for the continuation process Semantics Properties Our analysis is correct with respect to the operational semantics of LYSA. The detailed proofs are omitted due to space limitations and can be found in [4] .
We have the following results. The rst states that estimates are resistant to substitution of closed terms for variables, and it holds for both extended terms and processes. The second one says that estimates respect . Lemma 1. The next theorem shows that our analysis correctly predicts when we can safely do without the reference monitor. We shall say that the reference monitor RM cannot abort a process P when there exist no Q; Q H such that P 3 £ Q 3 Q H and P 3 £ RM Q 9 RM . (As usual, * stands for the transitive and reexive closure of the relation in question, and we omit the string of labels in this case; while Modelling the Attackers In a protocol execution, several principals exchange messages over an open network, which is therefore vulnerable to a malicious attacker. We assume it is an active Dolev-Yao attacker [10] : it can eavesdrop, and replay, encrypt, decrypt, generate messages providing that the necessary information is within his knowledge, that it increases while interacting with the network. This attacker can be modelled in LYSA as a process running in parallel with the protocol process. Formally, we shall have P sys j P , where P sys represents the protocol process and P is some arbitrary attacker. To get an account of the innitely many attackers, the overall idea is to nd a formula p (for a similar treatment see [5] ) that characterizes P : this means that whenever a triple (; ; ) satises it, then (; ) j = P : and this holds for all attackers, in particular for the hardest one [21] . Intuitively, the formula p has to mimic how P is analysed. The attacker process is parameterised on some attributes of P sys , e.g. the length of all the encryptions that occurred and all the messages sent over the network. In the formula, the names and variables the attacker uses are apart from the ones used by P sys . We can then postulate a new distinguished name n (variable z ) in which the names (variables, resp.) of the attacker are coalesced; therefore n may represent any name generated by the attacker, while (z ) represents the attacker knowledge. It is possible to prove that if an estimate of a process P with = Y satises the attacker formula than RM does not abort the execution of P j Q, regardless of the choice of the attacker Q. Further details are in [4, 5] .
Implementation Following [5] , the implementation can be obtained along the lines that rst transform the analysis into a logically equivalent formulation written in Alternation free Least Fixed Point logic (ALFP) [22] , and then followed by using the Succinct Solver [22] , which computes the least interpretation of the predicate symbols in a given ALFP formula.
Validation of the Amended Needham-Schroeder Protocol
Here, we will show that the analysis applied to the Amended Needham-Schroeder protocol, successfully captures the complex type confusion leading to the attack, presented in the Introduction.
In LYSA, each instance of the protocol is modelled as three processes, A, B and S, running in parallel within the scope of the shared keys. To allow the complex type confusion to arise, we put two instances together, and add indices to names and variables used in each instance in order to tell them apart, namely
To save space, processes without indices are shown in Tab. 3. For clarity, each message begins with the pair of principals involved in the exchange. In LYSA we do not have other data constructors than encryption, but the predecessor operation can be modelled by an encryption with the key PRED that is also known to the attacker. For the sake of readability, we directly use N 1. We can apply our analysis and check that (; ) j = P NS : , where ; and have the non-empty entries (only the interesting ones) listed in Tab Moreover, the non-empty error component shows that a many-to-one binding may happen in the decryption with label l 6 and therefore suggests a possible complex type confusion leading to a complex type aw attack.
By studying the contents of the analysis components and , we can rebuild The attacker replays this to A, who takes it as the message from S in the step 4 of the rst instance ((N 1 A ; B; n ; N 2 A ) P (x 1 z )). The entry (n ) P (x 1 k ) reects that in decrypting message 4, A binds x 1 k to the concatenation of values (n ) to be used as the session key. After completing the challenge and response in step 6 and 7, A then believes she is talking to B using the session key K, but indeed she is talking to the attacker using (n ) as the new key. This exactly corresponds to the complex type aw attack shown before.
The protocol can be modied such that each principal use dierent keys for dierent roles, i.e. all the principals taking the initiator's role A i share a master key K i A with the server and all the principals taking the responder's role B j share K j B with the server. In this case, the analysis holds for = Y and thereby it guarantees the absence of complex type confusions attacks.
Here, only two sessions are taken into account. However, as in [5] , the protocol can be modelled in a way that multiple principals are participating in the protocol at the same time and therefore mimic the scenario that several sessions are running together. Due to space limitation, further details are skipped here.
Conclusion
We say that a complex type confusion attack happens when a concatenation of elds in a message is interpreted as a single eld. This kind of attack is not easy to deal with in a process algebraic setting, because message specications are given at a high level: the focus is on their contents and not on their structure. In this paper, we extended the notation of variable binding in the process calculus LYSA from one-to-one to many-to-one binding, thus making it easier to model the scenario where a list of elds is confused with a single eld. The semantics of the extended LYSA makes use of a reference monitor to capture the possible many-to-one bindings at run time. We mechanise the search for complex type confusions by dening a Control Flow Analysis for the extended LYSA calculus. It checks at each input and decryption place whether a many-to-one binding may happen. The analysis ensures that, if no such binding is possible, then the process is not subject to complex type aw attacks at run time. As far as the attacker is concerned, we adopted the standard notion from Dolev-Yao threat model [10] , and we enriched it to deal with the new kind of variable binding.
We applied our Control Flow Analysis to the Amended Needham-Schroeder Protocol (as shown in Section 3), to Otway-Rees [23] , Yahalom [8] (not reported, because of lack of space). It has conrmed that we can successfully detect the complex type confusions leading to type aw attacks on those protocols. This detection is done in a purely mechanical and static way. The analysis also conrms the complex type aw attacks on a version of the Neuman-Stubblebine protocol, found in [27] .
The technique presented here is for detecting complex type aw attacks only. Simple type aw attacks, i.e. two single elds of dierent types are confused with each other, not considered here, have been addressed instead in [6] , under a framework similar to the present one. Besides the type tags, several kinds of annotations for LYSA has been developed for validating various security properties, e.g. condentiality [12] , freshness [11] and message authentication [5] . They can be easily combined with the annotations introduced here, thus giving more comprehensive results.
Usual formal frameworks for the verication of security protocols need to be suitably extended for modelling complex type aw confusions. Extensions include the possibility to decompose and rebuild message components, that we obtain by playing with single, general and attened values. In [7] , for instance, the author uses a concatenation operator to glue together dierent components in messages. The approach is based on linear logic and it is capable of nding the complex type aw attack on the Otway-Rees protocol. Meadows [17, 18] approach is more general and can address also even more complex type confusions, e.g. those due to the confusion between pieces of elds of one type with pieces of another. The author, using the GDOI protocol as running example, develops a model of types that assumes diering capacities for checking types by principals. Moreover, Meadows presents a procedure to determine whether the types of two messages can be confused, then also evaluating the probability of possible misinterpretations. In [15] , using the AVISPA [3] model checking tool, type aw attacks of the GDOI protocol are captured. Furthermore, by using the Object-Z schema calculus [28, 14] the authors verify the attacks at a lower level and nd which are the low-level assumptions that lead to the attacks and which are the requirements that prevent them. Type confusions are captured also in [19] , by using an ecient Prolog based constraint solver. The above settings, especially the ones in [17, 18, 15] , are more general than our, e.g. they capture more involved kinds of type confusions in a complex setting, like the one of the GDOI protocol. Our work represents a rst step in modelling lower level features of protocol specications in a process algebraic setting, like the ones that lead to type confusions. The idea is to only perform the renement of the high-level specications necessary to capture the low-level feature of interest. Our control ow analysis procedure always guarantees termination, even though it only oers an approximation of protocols behaviour and of their dynamic properties. Due to the nature of the over-approximation, false positives may happen, as some of the many-to-one bindings are not necessary leading to a complex type aw attack. By taking the bit length of each eld into account, i.e. using them as thresholds like in [25, 26] , may greatly reduce the number of false positives. For example, assuming that a nonce, N , is always represented by 8 bits, an agent's name, A, by 8 bits, and a key, K, by 12 bits, the concatenation of A and N will be never confused with K and therefore it can be ruled out. In this paper we focussed on a particular kind of confusions, leaving other kind of type confusions for future work. We could use one-to-many bindings to deal with the case in which pieces of elds are confused with each other. We also would like to move to the multi-protocol setting, where the assumptions adopted in each protocol could be dierent, but messages could be easily confused, typically, because of the re-use of keys.
